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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature 0f the Case
Petitioners—Appellants, forty-three prisoners (hereinafter Williams et

County Jail

(Jail),

challenging conditions of conﬁnement during the

from the Order of the
habeas corpus.

On

district court dismissing,

appeal, Williams et

a1.

a1.)

in the

Elmore

COVID- 1 9 pandemic,

0n summary judgment,

appeal

their petitions for writs

of

challenge the district court’s judgment in favor 0f the

Respondents (Sheriff Mike Hollinshead and

Jail

Commander/Lt. Shauna Gavin, hereinafter the

“Sheriff”) for lack of administrative exhaustion or applicable excuse and, alternatively, the

conditions of

conﬁnement claim

failing to raise a

genuine issue of material fact and the Sheriff

being entitled to judgment as a matter 0f law. Williams

awarding the Sheriff attorney’s fees under Idaho Code

et a1. also

challenge the court’s order

§ 12-122.

Statement 0f Facts and Course 0f Proceedings

On April

3,

2020, Williams

et a1.,

nine female prisoners in the

Jail,

jointly petitioned the

Idaho Supreme Court for habeas corpus relief — release from custody — based upon their
contention that the “current conditions of conﬁnement constitute a clear and present Violation 0f
the Eighth
a1.

Amendment

banning cruel and unusual punishment.”

(R., pp. 7-16.)

Williams

et

claimed their conditions of conﬁnement constituted an extreme emergency and extraordinary

circumstances and placed them in imminent danger 0f physical injury. (R.,

p. 8.)

Thus, they

claimed t0 be exempt from the Idaho Code § 19-4206 requirement to exhaust administrative
remedies. (R., p.

8.)

The Sheriff ﬁled a motion
(improper venue) and (6) (failure t0
21.)

to dismiss pursuant t0 Idaho
state a

Rule of CiV. Proc. 12(b)(3)

claim upon Which relief can be granted). (R., pp. 17-

The Idaho Supreme Court transferred the petition t0

the district court in

Elmore County.

(R.,

pp. 22-24.)

The
petition t0

district court

go forward s0

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

noted that habeas corpus
that

Williams

(Williams et

et a1.

al. v.

is

an individual remedy; but allowed the

would have
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prisoner exhausted the Jail’s administrative process 0r, alternatively, that an exception t0

exhaustion applied. (R., pp. 36-39.) Thirty-four male prisoners ﬁled a separate petition for a writ

0f habeas corpus alleging the same conditions of conﬁnement and relief as the nine female
to consolidate the cases (R., pp. 41-44),

which

they “met the requisite threshold t0 ﬁle the habeas corpus

relief.

and ﬁled a motion

petitioners. (Aug. R., pp.1-15)

the district court granted (R., pp. 237-39).

Williams

et a1. asserted

The

(R., pp. 25-34, 47.)

imminent

petitioners claimed the conditions at the Jail

threat t0 the petitioners

whom

are prisoners,

and

and COVID-19 present an

that petitioners

Who were

pretrial

detainees were not required t0 exhaust administrative remedies before ﬁling a petition. (R., pp.
31, 47-49.) Therefore, “[t]here

is

no need, and frankly n0 time,

to seek ‘administrative remedies”

because the “imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception applied.

Williams

et a1.

submitted handwritten statements,

Which they claimed evidenced
been rebuffed 0r ignored.

all

but one of Which was dated April 15, 2020,

their attempts t0 obtain relief

(R., pp. 5 1, 59-60, 63-95.) Finally,

had been granted broad and ﬂexible remedies under I.A.R.
appellate rules to

The

trial

from the

of which had

Sheriff, all

they asserted that the

district court

5(d), despite the inapplicability

of the

court proceedings 0n a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (R., p. 52.)

district court

Jail’s administrative

(R., pp. 31-34.)

ordered Williams

et a1. to

show

remedy processes or that each was

that each prisoner

entitled to

had exhausted the

an exception t0 the exhaustion

requirement. (R., pp. 36-39.) In response, Williams et a1 alleged a

number of unsanitary

conditions in the Jail which, they claimed “met the requisite threshold t0 ﬁle the habeas corpus
[petition]” (R., pp. 25-34, 47-49)

and the “imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception

to the exhaustion requirement applied per
et a1.

Idaho Code

§

19-4206

(R., pp. 3 1-34, 47-48).

Williams

submitted a brief (R., pp. 45-54) and a declaration from their attorney with handwritten

statements from

some 0f

the petitioners, asserting the statements evidenced their attempts t0

obtain relief from the Sheriff,

all

0f which had been rebuffed or ignored.

The Sheriff answered the petitions
Declaration of

Jail

Commander/Lt. Shauna Gavin

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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,

59-60.)

106-121; Aug. R., pp. 16-34) supported by the

(R., pp.

Exhibits describing conditions at the Jail and the

(R., pp. 5

(R., pp.

225-236; Aug. R., pp. 133-144) and

COVID-19

Hollinshead)

mitigation measures implemented

— Page

8

there (R., pp. 136-224;

Aug.

The Sheriff moved
et a1. failed t0

R., pp. 35-132).

summary judgment 0n

the district court for

the grounds that Williams

exhaust administrative remedies before ﬁling their petitions and, alternatively, failed

t0 (1) demonstrate that

each petitioner

“is in

imminent danger of serious physical injury” so as

excuse the failure of each t0 exhaust administrative remedies or (2) that the Elmore County

t0

Jail

does not have any system for administrative remedy and, therefore; that administrative exhaustion
is futile

and must be waived.1

(R., pp. 122-126.)

accompanied by a brief in supportz
the Declaration 0f Lt.

With

Shauna Gavin

March

Sheriff” s

motion for summary judgment was

(R., pp. 127-135), incorporating the
(R., pp.

the Respondent’s motions for

the Sheriffproduce a

The

Answer

(R., pp. 106-121),

225-236), and exhibits (R., pp. 136-224).

summary judgment pending, Williams

17, 2020, list ofnon-Violent offenders the

Attorney sought to have released from the jail.

(R., pp. 252-53.)

et a1.

requested

Elmore County Prosecuting

After consulting the Prosecuting

Attorney, the Sheriff released a redacted copy of the document, in Which the Prosecutor stated
“[a]s per the Sheriff’ s request,

I

examined the jail

roster to see if there is anything

nonviolent folks out 0f the jail t0 reduce overcrowding.

most

I

picked the 17 cases that

likely to yield positive results.” (R., pp. 256-257, 269-270.)

I

I

can do to

let

thought were

The document disclosed

seventeen names With comments. (R., pp. 257-258.) After the Sheriff released a redacted copy 0f
the

document

in response,

Williams

et a1.

sought an expedited motion for discovery (R., pp. 240-

243, 244-270) seeking t0 compel the Sheriff to produce an unredacted copy 0f the document. The
district court

denied the petitioners’ expedited motion for discovery, concluding the Sheriff had

1

The Appellants have failed t0 include in the record 0n appeal the Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment ﬁled
on April 22, 2020, in Elmore County Case CV20-20-382, contemporaneously with the Answers, Declarations, and
Exhibits ﬁled in Elmore County Cases CV20-20-380 and CV20-20-382. The Respondent’s Motion for Summary
Judgment in Elmore County Case CV20-20-382 addresses the same claims and presents the same arguments and
authorities as the Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment included in the record on appeal.
2

The Appellants have

failed to include in the record

Summary Judgment, ﬁled 0n

on appeal the Brief

in Support

of Respondent’s Motion for

April 22, 2020, in Elmore County Case CV20-20-382, contemporaneously with the

Answers, Declarations and Exhibits ﬁled in Elmore County Cases CV20-20-380 and CV20-20-382. The Brief in
Support 0f Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Elmore County Case CV20-20-382 addresses the same
claims and presents the same arguments and authorities as the Brief in Support of Respondent’s Motion for Summary
Judgment included in the record on appeal.
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already disclosed the document Williams et

a1.

sought leave t0 obtain through discovery and,

show “discovery is necessary t0 protect

therefore, petitioners failed t0

or defend a substantive state

0r federal constitutional right at issue.” (R., pp. 271-275.)

Williams

judgment

(R., pp.

et a1.

submitted a brief in opposition t0 the Sheriff” s motions for

summary

322-347) accompanied by a Declaration With attached copies 0f the March 25,

2020, order t0 self—isolate from the Director 0f the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare and
the Center for Disease Control’s Interim Guidance

(COVID-19)

in Correctional

and Detention

on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019

Facilities (R., pp.

280-321) and argued that the

hygiene, quarantine, and social distancing recommendations were not being met at the

The

district court

granted the Sheriff’ s Motions for

Summary Judgment 0n the basis 0f the

petitioners’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (R., pp. 354-359.)
part, the petitioners’

mere handwritten statements

under penalty ofperjury as t0

their truth

the existence of administrative

3

The

Jail’s

(i.e.,

The court explained,

not notarized and not declarations

and accuracy per Idaho Code

remedy procedures

Jail.

§

in

made

9- 1406), While referencing

in the Jail3 (R., pp. 375-376), failed t0

Inmate Handbook (Aug. R., pp. 71-79) addresses inmate requests and grievances and the process and

timeline for appealing to the Jail Administrator:

Requests

have a question 0r concern, you may have it addressed verbally by asking the detention staff
you may submit an Inmate Request Via the kiosk in your pod. Detention staff may not be able t0
answer all verbal requests, s0 they may specify that you submit an Inmate Request. Requests will

If you

or

be answered in a timely manner.
Grievances
If you

have a grievance you should ﬁrst contact a detention

staff member to voice the grievance. If

not resolved by the staff member, you can then contact the shift supervisor. If still not resolved,
you may submit an Inmate Grievance addressed t0 the Jail Administrator. If you cannot complete
it is

form you may request assistance from any staff member 0r another inmate. Normally
an answer will be returned in a few days. If the grievance constitutes an emergency, you will be
segregated[,] and the Jail Administrator Will be contacted. N0 retaliation will be allowed by staff

the grievance

towards any inmate ﬁling a grievance.
If you wish to appeal the answer, you

may ﬁle an appeal to the Jail Administrator Within ten (10)
working days 0f the response.
(Aug. R., p.77). The district court concluded “[n]o proof has been presented that the Elmore County Jail does not
have an administrative remedy procedure.” (R., p.375.) The petitioners’ own handwritten statements showed the
availability of the Jail’s administrative remedy procedures and that Williams et a1. acknowledged their existence as
set forth in the Inmate Handbook, just as the district court found. (R., pp. 375-76.)
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demonstrate exhaustion of administrative remedies4 (R., pp. 354-359).

COVID—19

Because there were n0

cases in the Jail and, considering the mitigation procedures described in Lt. Gavin’s

declaration and the Sheriff’ s exhibits, the court concluded the petitioners failed to

danger of serious

at the

show imminent

time the petition was ﬁled, as an excuse for their failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. (R., pp. 377-381.)

Secondarily, the district court concluded Williams et

COVID—19

a1.,

mitigation procedures t0 keep the Virus out of the

failed t0 controvert the Jail’s
jail,

through contact limiting

measures, quarantines, and other measures as set forth in Lt. Gavin’s declaration and the Sheriff” s
Instead, Williams et

exhibits. (R., pp. 383-389.)

the social distancing

a1,

merely argued that the

and prisoner separation measures

correctional facilities and

is

not employing

CDC guidelines for jails and

also taking insufﬁcient measures, as set forth in the guidelines, t0

sanitize prisoner living spaces. (R., p. 389.)

conceded social distancing

set forth in the

jail is

is

Reviewing the

not achievable at the Jail as

concluded the guidance were recommendations that

CDC guidelines, and noting the Sheriff
it

may be

would be outside the

Jail,

the court

adapted to the unique circumstances

0f different correctional and detention centers and the Sheriff has chosen t0 act in response t0 the

COVID—19

threat

by seeking

t0

keep the Virus out of the jail, through contact limiting measures,

quarantines, and other mitigation measures. (R., pp. 390-391.)
allegations 0f Williams et
thereafter,

Williams

a1.

were controverted by the

et a1. failed to present

The court found

the petition

Sheriff’s exhibits (R., pp. 391-392) and,

admissible evidence sufﬁcient to raise a genuine issue

0f material fact that the Sheriff was not only aware of the risk posed t0 them by the

COVID-19

Virus, but that their actions in response constituted deliberate indifference or the imposition

punishment in Violation 0f their constitutional rights

The court declined
to the Sheriff” s

4

The court

(R., pp.

of

393-396).

to address the petitioners’ claim raised for the ﬁrst time in opposition

summary judgment motion that their due process

rights

were being violated by the

were entitled t0 piggyback onto another prisoner’s grievance. The
was a non-speciﬁc request by one prisoner, Alex Michael Litz, requesting
that jail staff “do something” about COVID-l9, and Litz’s unappealed grievance failed to demonstrate Litz exhausted
the Jail’s administrative remedies, let alone demonstrated exhaustion by any other petitioner. (R., p. 376.)
rejected the petitioners claim that they

court found the only evidence 0f a grievance
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delay in receiving hearings 0r going t0
the case to the

Elmore County

trial,

resulting

district court. (R., pp.

from the Idaho Supreme Court’s transfer of

396-397.)

Finally, reviewing the petitioners’ failure to individually exhaust administrative remedies,
their fallacious

“piggyback” exhaustion theory, failure t0 provide sworn or equivalent statements,

assertion of bare and conclusory claims, failure t0 identify any actions of the Sheriff constituting
deliberate indifference or unconstitutional imposition of punishment, erroneous insistence that the

Sheriff bear the burden to

and

their pursuit

new claim

show cause why habeas

relief should not

be granted under I.A.R.

0f discovery sanctions When discovery was not authorized, and attempt t0 raise a

for the ﬁrst time in their response to the Sheriff’ s

summary judgment motion,

found the habeas proceedings brought by the petitioners were frivolous.
attorney’s fees t0 the Sheriff pursuant to I.C. § 12-122 as requested

Williams

May

18,

5(d),

et a1.

ﬁled a timely notice of appeal

(R.,

by

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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the Sheriff.

pp.405-409) from the

2020, entry ofjudgment (R., pp. 403-404).
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the court

district court’s

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Petitioner-Appellants have phrased the issues

Did the

1.

0n appeal

ﬁnding

district court err in

as:

that the threat

of

COVID-19

did not

present a threat 0f imminent danger to the Petitioners?

Can a habeas corpus petition be ﬁled by a detainee Who has been wrongfully

2.

conﬁned

as a result of undue delays in court proceedings?

Did

3.

the district court err in denying discovery requests pertaining t0 issues

raised in the petition and pleadings 0f the Respondents?

Did the

4.

under

I.C. §

awarding Respondents

district court err in

their attorney’s fees

12-122?

(Appellant’s brief, p.19.)

Respondents Wish
1.

Did

t0 rephrase the issues as follows:

the District Court correctly apply the law in concluding that Williams et

excused from exhausting the

Jail’s available administrative

petitions for a writ of habeas corpus
Is the

and

a1.

were not

remedies prior to ﬁling their

that each failed t0 demonstrate exhaustion?

claim of a due process Violation resulting from undue delays in court proceedings

not properly before this appellate court where

it

was not alleged

in the petitions?

Have the Petitioners failed to show the District Court abused its broad discretion in denying
Petitioner’s

motion for discovery where Williams

et a1. failed to

show

that discovery

necessary to protect or defend a substantive state or federal constitutional right
Is the District

and each

Court’s unchallenged conclusion that habeas corpus

failed t0 raise a genuine issue

judgment as a matter 0f law an

Did the

District

at issue?

an individual remedy

of material fact and the Sheriff was entitled to

alternate basis for

granting the Respondent’s Motion for

is

was

afﬁrming the

District Court’s

Order

Summary Judgment?

Court correctly apply Idaho Code § 12-122 in awarding Respondents their

attorneys’ fees?

Are Respondents’

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

entitled t0 statutory attorney’s fees
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ARGUMENT
I.

Williams

Have Failed t0 Carry Their Burden 0f Showing the District Court Erred in
Law in Concluding that the Petitioners Were Not Excused from Their Failure to

et al.

Applying the
Exhaust Available Administrative Remedies Prior to Filing Their Petition for a Writ

Of Habeas

Cogpus
A.

Introduction

On
pandemic

appeal, Williams et

a1.

itself meets the threshold

contend the facts in

isolation,

and other mitigation measures

petitioner

was

§

and caselaw suggest

of immediate threat (Appellant’s

their contention, the uncontroverted facts

Code

this case

show

Br., pp. 20-24.)

Contrary to

the Sheriff had implemented hygiene,

new inmate

keep COVID-19 out of the

to

Jail

and n0 individual

“in imminent danger 0f serious physical injury.” Therefore, as required

19-4206(1) and

(2),

Williams

et a1.

were each individually required

administrative remedies had been exhausted

that a

when

to

show

by Idaho

that available

the petition for a writ 0f habeas corpus

was

ﬁled.5

5

Federal case law assists in interpreting the exhaustion requirement of Idaho’s statute. See Carlee

Fire

&

Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 396, 224 P.3d 458, 463 (2008) (noting that

impression involving Idaho statutes

we may

when

v.

Kootenai County

confronted With matters 0f ﬁrst

glean insight from the interpretations of sister jurisdictions concerning

Valdez, 149 Idaho 764, 768, 241 P.3d 7, 11 (Ct. App. 2010). Federal
law contains an exhaustion requirement similar t0 that found in I.C. 19—4206(1) in the Prison Litigation Reform Act
0f 1995 (PLRA), which states that “[n]0 action shall be brought with respect t0 prison conditions under [42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner conﬁned in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a). In Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,
83, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382 (2006), the Supreme Court examined whether a prisoner can satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement by ﬁling an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal. The Court
in Woodford, in examining Whether the ﬁling of a procedurally defective grievance form satisﬁed the exhaustion
requirement, noted that the purpose 0f the exhaustion doctrine is threefold. It “attempts t0 eliminate unwarranted
federal-court interference With the administration 0f prisons, and thus seeks to ‘affor[d] corrections ofﬁcials time and
opportunity t0 address complaints internally before allowing the initiation 0f a federal case,’” is “intended t0 reduce
the quantity” 0f prisoner lawsuits, and is meant t0 “improve the quality 0f prisoner suits.” 548 U.S. at 93, 126 S. Ct.
at 2387. In concluding that a procedurally defective grievance did not satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the Court
explained “[p]r0per exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules
because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its
proceedings.” Id. at 90—91, 126 S. Ct. at 2386. Therefore, the prisoner’s claim should be dismissed, as failure to
exhaust administrative remedies must carry a sanction in order to avoid becoming a “toothless” requirement. Id. at 95,
126 S. Ct. at 2388. The appellate court in Butters, 149 Idaho 768—69, 241 P.3d at 11—12, found the reasoning in
Woodford persuasive and concluded the exhaustion requirement under I.C. § 19—4206(1) demands that the procedural
and ﬁling deadlines 0f a state 0r local correctional facility’s administrative remedy process be complied With.
similar 0r identical statutes); cited in Butters

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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The

B.

District Court’s

Order Granting the Sheriff’s Motion for Summary Judgment for
Remedies Is Unchallenged 0n Appeal

Failure to Exhaust Administrative

On

appeal Williams et

a1.

has expressly declined t0 address exhaustion of administrative

remedies. (Appellant’s Br., p. 21.) Williams et
the threshold 0f an immediate threat.”

summary judgment
explained in State

The

v.

an issue was waived

is

itself meets

order granting the Sheriff s motion for
is

As

unchallenged on appeal.

if

it

issues

on appeal are not supported by propositions of law,

be considered.” Earlier formulations 0f the rule had stated

was not supported with argument and

263, 923 P.2d at 970 (citing cases).

0r argument

district court’s

COVID—19 “pandemic

Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (citing I.A.R. 35), and

authority, or argument, they will not

at

contend the

for failure t0 exhaust administrative remedies

numerous cases since Zichko, “[w]hen

that

a1.

authority. Zichko, 129 Idaho

A party waives an issue cited 0n appeal if either authority

lacking, not just if both are lacking. State

Gurney, 152 Idaho 502, 505, 272 P.3d

v.

474, 477 (2012) (because Gurney cites no authority for the proposition that the district court was
obligated to consider diminution 0f the public interest over time and

completion of a diversionary program, the issue

923 P.2d

at 970.

is

upon a defendant’s successful

waived on appeal); Zichko, 129 Idaho

Likewise, because Williams et

administrative remedies, they have waived this issue

a1.

at

263,

have declined to argue exhaustion 0f

on appeal. The

the petitions for failure to exhaust administrative remedies

is

district court’s dismissal

of

not challenged on appeal and should

not be reviewed.

C.

Even

if

Williams

et a1.

Had Not Waived

Appellate Review 0f the District Court’s

Conclusion that TheV Failed to Exhaust Administrative Remedies, the District Court Did
in Granting Summary Judgment to the Sheriff 0n this Basis

Not Err
The
were

in

district court

explained Williams et

a1.

failed to establish, t0 its satisfaction, that they

imminent danger of serious physical injury due

t0 the

mere existence 0f the COVID—19

pandemic:
[F]or the imminent danger exception to apply, the

must be

“real

[] condition [of conﬁnement]
and proximate” and the danger of serious physical injury must exist

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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at the

time the complaint

is

ﬁled. See Rittner

(6th Cir. 2008). This approach

makes

v.

Kinder, 290 F. Appx. 796, 797-98

sense, due to the fact that exhaustion 0f

remedies must occur prior t0 the ﬁling of the petition and

this is

an exhaustion

exception.

“Imminent”

Imminent is not deﬁned as
meaning possibly 0r potentially. See also Poison Creek Publishing. Inc. v. Central
Idaho Publishing, Ina, 134 Idaho 426, 429, 3 P.3d 1254, 1257 (2000) (“The
cardinal rule 0f statutory construction is that Where a statute is plain, clear and
unambiguous, we are constrained to follow that plain meaning and neither add t0
the statute nor take

is

deﬁned

as “ready to take place.”

away by judicial

begins With an examination of the

construction. Statutory interpretation always

literal

words of the

statute

.

.

.

we must assume

is clearly stated in the statute. We must give the
and ordinary meaning, and there is no occasion for
construction Where the language of a statute is unambiguous. We furthermore must
give every word, clause and sentence effect, if possible.”).

that the legislature

words

means What

their plain, usual

Given the number 0f conﬁrmed COVID-19 cases at the time 0f the ﬁling of
“it has not been shown that any of the petitioners is in
imminent danger of serious physical injury, “With zero conﬁrmed cases at the jail
and a small number 0f conﬁrmed cases in the county and even in the state as a

the initial petition

whole.
In addition, the mitigation procedures detailed below, as set forth in Lt.
Gavin’s declaration and the respondents’ exhibits, fail to support a ﬁnding that the
petitioners are (0r

were

at the

time 0f the ﬁling of their petitions) facing imminent

danger of serious physical injury.
In sum, the threat of COVID-19, as numerous courts have held, does not
excuse the exhaustion requirement,“ nor is just the threat 0f COVID-19 sufﬁcient
to

make

the

imminent danger of serious physical injury

t0

the

exhaustion

requirement applicable here, as numerous courts have also held.
In View of the foregoing, the respondents’

summary judgment

Will

be

granted, due t0 the failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies.
(R., pp.

D.

377-82 (footnotes omitted».

The
5(d)

Claim
Without Merit

Petitioners’
is

In the

trial

that the District

court Williams et

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

a1.

(Williams et

Court Erred bV Not Applying Idaho Appellate Rule

asserted that the district court

al. v.

Hollinshead)

— Page

16

had been granted broad and

ﬂexible remedies under I.A.R. 5(d) (R., p. 52.), despite the inapplicability 0f the appellate rule to

proceedings 0n a petition for writ of habeas corpus, I.A.R. 5(a), or issuance 0f a writ, I.A.R. 5(d).

On appeal, Williams et a1.

repeats the meritless claim the district court erred in not applying I.A.R.

5(d) t0 switch the burden ofproof to the respondents t0

“show cause Why the

relief requested

n the

petition should not be granted.” (Appellant’s B11, pp. 25-26.)

Idaho Supreme Court exercises free review over questions of law, whether constitutional
questions or questions of statutory interpretation. Stuart

818 (2010)

(citing

Federated Publ ’ns,

1031, 1034 (2008)). There
statute 0r regulation,
rests

upon

is

Inc.

v.

v.

State,

149 Idaho 35, 40, 232 P.3d 813,

Idaho Bus. Rev., Ina, 146 Idaho 207, 210, 192 P.3d

a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of the challenged

and the burden of establishing that the

the challengers. Stuart, 149 Idaho at 40,

statute or regulation is unconstitutional

232 P.3d

at

818

(citations omitted).

Idaho Appellate Rule 5(d) sets forth the procedure for issuance of special writs and
expressly excludes writs of habeas corpus.6

As

nature of the habeas corpus as a constitutional
liberty

and

its

set forth

below, Rule 5(d) recognizes the unique

remedy

t0 preserve constitutional safeguards

of

subsequent statutory expansion through the Habeas Corpus and Institutional

Litigation Procedures

Act

to address a speciﬁc set

0f claims — those ﬁled by inmates to “request

that a court inquire into state or federal constitutional questions concerning:
(a)

The conditions 0f his conﬁnement;

(b)

Revocation of parole;

(c)

Miscalculation of his sentence;

(d)

Loss of good time

(e)

A detainer lodged against him.”

credits;

Idaho Code § 19—4203(2). Rule 5
it

6

were applicable, the

As

the Idaho

is

inapplicable to habeas proceedings in the

rule does not abrogate Idaho

Supreme Court noted

in Leavitt

v.

Code

trial courts.

§ 19-4209(7)(b) (the evidentiary

Craven, 154 Idaho 661, 665, 302 P.3d

1,

Even

burden

5 (2012), construing

former I.A.R. 5(a) and (c), no response t0 an application for a writ of mandamus is permitted “unless the Supreme
Court requests a party t0 respond t0 the application before granting or denying the same.” However, the Idaho

Supreme Court may,

in the exercise 0f its discretion, order brieﬁng 0r

argument in any special writ proceeding

brought before the court.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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if

“lies

with the petitioner”) and require respondents to “show cause”

why

a writ should not be

granted.

II.

Because Williams et a1. Did Not Properly Present a Claim that COVID-19 Related Delays in
Cases Violated their Rights to Due Process in their Petitions for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Such a Claim Has Not Been Preserved For Appellate Review

their Criminal

A.

Introduction

Williams

et a1.

claim that delays in criminal court proceedings violated their right to due

process. (Appellant’s Br., p. 32.)

No

habeas corpus proceedings — which are
I.R.C.P.

1

and Idaho Code

civil cases subject to the

No

§ 19-4208.

trial

such claim was properly raised in the

on the merits with the express 0r implied consent 0f the

Williams

in opposition to the Sheriff’s

et a1. for the ﬁrst time,

Supreme Court’s emergency order
in Violation

argue

district court.

8 or 15(1), nor considered

parties per I.R.C.P. 15(2), the

court does not err in declining to consider such claim. See Furniss

570 P.2d 854, 860 (1977). Only

the complaint in

Rules of Civil Procedure under

Where a claim was neither raised in the pleadings as required by I.R.C.P.
at a trial

—

such claim was raised in the petitions

v.

Park, 98 Idaho 617, 623

summary judgment motion,

that, “in addition t0 the threat

did

of COVID-19, the Idaho

limiting court activities caused petitioners’ cases to be delayed

of their right to due process,

in their criminal cases (R., p. 332)]

i.e.,

timely resolution of their claims

and access

t0 courts has

[i.e.,

the “charges”

been detrimentally affected

(R., pp.

331-32).

B.

The

District Court

Did Not Err In Declining T0 Consider Whether

the Petitioners’

Due

Process Rights were Violated bV Delay in Criminal Proceedings Resulting from the

COVID—19 Pandemic

A habeas corpus petition is analogous t0 a civil complaint. Acheson
156, 159, 75 P.3d 210, 213 (Ct. App. 2003). In ruling

judgment, the

district court

0n the

Klauser, 139 Idaho

motion for summary

declined to address whether the petitioners’ due process rights were

being violated by the delay in receiving hearings or going t0

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Sheriff’s

v.

(Williams et

al. v.

Hollinshead)

trial in their

— Page

18

criminal cases. (R., pp.

396-397.) Despite their assertion 0n appeal that they raised a claim that delays in criminal court

proceedings violated their right to due process (Appellant’s Br.,
generally Aug. R., pp.

1-15),

Williams

et a1.

COVID-19 pandemic

28-29; and

never presented a concise statement 0f facts

constituting a claim for habeas corpus relief based

the

p. 32, citing R., pp. 8,

on delay

in court proceedings resulting

resulting in Violations of the prisoner-petitioners’ right to

I.R.C.P. 8(a). Contrary to the contention of Williams et

a1.

from

due process.

that the district court should

have

amend

their

considered the effect on their liberty interests, the petitioners did not seek leave to
petitions t0 include such a claim pursuant t0 I.R.C.P. 15.

For the

C.

t0

First

Time on Appeal,

the Petitioners’

Claim that the

Petitioner’s Right t0

Due

on appeal.

for the ﬁrst time

Row v.

State, 135

that

it

Will not consider issues that are raised

Idaho 573, 580, 21 P.3d 895, 902 (2001) (citing State

Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992)). The exception

may be

t0 this rule is that constitutional

considered for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal if such consideration

subsequent proceedings in the case. Row, 135 Idaho
subsequent proceedings in

this

COVID-19

Process

The longstanding rule ofthe Supreme Court is

issues

Court Erred in Failing

Consider the Effect 0f Delay in Court Proceedings Resulting from the

Pandemic 0n the

v.

District

at

is

necessary for

580, 21 P.3d at 902. Because there are no

case, the exception does not apply.

Therefore, the Sheriff

respectfully requests that this Court decline the petitioners’ invitation to consider a constitutional

due process claim not raised in the petitions and for Which argument and authority are being

promoted by Williams

et a1. for the ﬁrst

time 0n appeal.

III.

Williams

et a1.

Petitioner’s

Have Failed t0 Show the District Court Abused Its Broad Discretion in Denying
for Discovery Where Williams et a1. Failed to Show that Discovery Was

Motion

Necessary to Protect 0r Defend a Substantive State or Federal Constitutional Right
Williams
to obtain a

et a1.

March

argues the district court abused

17, 2020, letter,

and

all

its

at Issue

discretion in denying leave for discovery

related correspondence

and documents

in their

unredacted form. (Appellant’s Br., pp. 35-39.) Ignoring the fact that the unredacted portions of
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two of the emails discuss the process
communications between attorneys

for enforcement of a quarantine order or are internal

in the

Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney’s Ofﬁce

259-66), and that only ﬁve of the forty-three petitioners were on the prosecutor’s

Williams

et a1.

speculate, that “[t]he prosecutor

and

jail ofﬁcials

information, policies and procedures pertaining t0 the threat of the
affect jail population”

and

that such

“was potentially relevant

(R., pp.

list (R., p.

272),

apparently communicated

COVID- 1 9 and how that would

to the [c]constitutional rights

0f the

[p]etitioners.” (Appellant’s Br., p. 39.)

Pursuant t0 Idaho Code § 19—42100), discovery shall not ordinarily be permitted in habeas
corpus cases. The decision t0 grant leave to pursue discovery in a habeas corpus proceeding
Within the discretion 0f the

trial court.

See, e.g.,

Storm

v.

is

Spaulding, 137 Idaho 145, 149, 44 P.3d

1200, 1204 (Ct. App. 2002) (an alleged discovery error in a habeas corpus action for an abuse 0f
discretion). “If factual issues are raised

by

the pleadings, the court may,

upon motion, grant leave

for discovery in accordance with Idaho rules 0f civil procedure.” I.C. § 19-4210(3).

“the court ﬁnds that discovery
constitutional right at issue,”
§ 19-4210(3)(b).

is

is

necessary t0 protect 0r defend a substantive state or federal

the court required t0 allow discovery for that limited purpose. LC.

The rank speculation of Williams

et a1.

does not demonstrate that discovery was

necessary t0 protect or defend a substantive state or federal constitutional right
4210(3).

Only Where

Therefore, Williams et

a1.

have failed

at issue. I.C. § 19-

t0 demonstrate the district court

abused

discretion in denying leave to pursue further discovery regarding the information the Sheriff

its

had

provided the petitioners.

IV.

Because The Petitioners Failed to Raise a Genuine Issue of Material Fact and the Sheriff was
Entitled t0 Judgment as a Matter 0f Law, the District Court’s Order granting the Respondent’s
Motion for Summary Judgment Must Be Afﬁrmed on Appeal
A.

Introduction

On

appeal Williams et

a1.

contend the facts regarding the prisoner-petitioners’ conditions

of conﬁnement and representations of the respondents regarding mitigation measures and
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By

sanitation are disputed. (Appellant’s Br., pp. 26-29.)

failing to present

any afﬁdavits 0r

declarations from the prisoner-petitioners setting forth facts controverting the Sheriff’ s answers,
declarations,

and

petitioners’ bare

by

the

Williams

exhibits,

et a1. failed t0 raise a

and conclusory allegations as

COVID-19

were insufﬁcient

Virus,

genuine issue of material

t0 their conditions

and the Sheriff’s mitigation measures

t0 withstand

The

of conﬁnement, the threat posed

t0

summary judgment. Furthermore,

fact.

keep the disease out 0f the
the petitioners” reliance

Jail

0n the

CDC guidelines and argument that appropriate hygiene, separation, and social distancing have not
been followed

of

to avoid the spread

COVID-19

in the Jail (Appellant’s Br., pp. 27-32) are

insufﬁcient t0 establish the Sheriff was not entitled t0 judgment as a matter of law.

B.

Standard 0f Review

Summary judgment on

and the moving party

issue of material fact
56(0).

On appeal, the

a habeas corpus petition
is

entitled t0

v.

judgment

when

there

is

n0 genuine

as a matter 0f law. I.R.P.C.

is

entitled to

judgment

Conchemco, Ina, 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280

assessing a motion for

favor of the

proper only

appellate court exercises free review in determining Whether a genuine issue

0f material fact exists and Whether the moving party

Edwards

is

summary judgment,

nonmoving party.

all

(Ct.

as a matter 0f law.

App. 1986).

When

controverted facts are t0 be liberally construed in

I.R.C.P. 56(a). Furthermore, the trial court

inferences in favor 0f the party resisting the motion.

G&

M Farms

v.

must draw

all

reasonable

Funk Irrigation

C0., 119

Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991).

C.

Standards Applicable t0 the District Court’s Decision to

Deny

the Petition for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus on Summary Judgment
Habeas corpus

is

an extraordinary

writ,

other adequate remedies are available. Flores

Mahaffey v.
corpus

is

State,

and
v.

its

use Will therefore be inappropriate where

Lodge, 101 Idaho 533, 617 P.2d 837 (1980);

87 Idaho 228, 23 1 392 P.2d 279, 281 (1964). The privilege 0f the writ ofhabeas
,

not a statutory remedy, but rather a remedy recognized and protected by Art.

the Idaho Constitution. Mahaffey, 87 Idaho at 23 1
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is

not a corrective remedy;

it is

concerned only with defects in a proceeding Which operate t0

render a judgment rendered, or process issued, therein absolutely void.” Application ofDowm'ng,

103 Idaho 689, 652 P.2d 193 (1982) (citing Smith
v.

proceedings are

civil in nature,

§

19—4208; Quinlan

149 (2003); Hoots

v.

v.

Habeas Corpus and
constitutional

State,

and generally the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply. Idaho Code

Idaho Comm'nfor Pardons

& Parole,

138 Idaho 726, 729, 69 P.3d 146,

Craven, 146 Idaho 271, 275, 192 P.3d 1095, 1099 (Ct. App. 2008). The
Institutional Litigation Procedures

remedy

94 Idaho 469, 474, 491 P.2d 733, 738

90 Idaho 339, 342—43, 411 P.2d 392, 393 (1966)). Habeas corpus

(1971); Stokes

State,

v.

to prisoners challenging conditions

Act

is

a statutory expansion of the

of conﬁnement and, as such, should be

construed so as t0 promote the effectiveness of the proceeding. Mahaﬂey, 87 Idaho at 231, 392

P.2d

at

280.

On
applies the

138 Idaho

appeal from a

summary judgment

in a habeas corpus proceeding, the appellate court

same standard of review utilized by the
at

729, 69 P.3d at 149.

On

trial

court

when ruling 0n the motion.

Quinlan,

appellate review, the court exercises free review in

determining Whether a genuine issue 0f material fact exists and Whether the moving party
entitled t0

judgment

as a matter 0f law.

depositions, and admissions

0n

Summary judgment

is

ﬁle, together With the afﬁdavits, if any,

genuine issue as t0 any material fact and that the moving party

oflaw.” I.R.C.P. 56(0); Van

AS

explained in Losee

v.

v.

PortneufMed.

Ctr.,

Deutsche Bank Nat’l

When

proper only

is

show

entitled to

“the pleadings,
that there is

147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009).

Tr. C0.,

165 Idaho 883, 887, 454 P.3d 525, 529

has long been understood that an afﬁdavit which meets the tenets 0f Rule 56(c)(4)
may be considered on summary judgment. See, e.g., Taft v. Jumbo Foods, Ina, 155
It

Idaho 511, 515, 314 P.3d 193, 197 (2013) (holding that three afﬁdavits were
summary judgment because they met the requirements of

properly considered on

Rule 56(6) [now Rule 56(c)(4)]); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 213, 868
P.2d 1224, 1229 (1994) (explaining that the trial court has discretion t0 decide
whether an afﬁdavit may be considered on summary judgment under Rule 56(6)

[now Rule 56(c)(4)] ). Furthermore, the concept that an afﬁdavit can be considered
by the court in making a summary judgment determination predates even the
adoption 0f the Idaho Rules 0f Evidence. See Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps,

(Williams et

al. v.

n0

judgment as a matter

(2019):
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Cessna Aircraft C0,, 97 Idaho 348, 353, 544 P.2d 306, 311 (1975)
(reiterating the oft-cited principle that “summary judgment should be granted only
When the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and afﬁdavits, liberally construed in
favor of the party opposing summary judgment, show that n0 genuine issue as t0
any material fact exists) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Such afﬁdavits are
considered at the summary judgment stage because they preview testimony Which
would be admissible at trial.

Inc.

165 Idaho

v.

at 887,

most favorable
favor. Jenkins

454 P.3d

529 (2019). The reviewing court construes the record

opposing the motion, drawing

t0 the party

v.

at

all

in the light

reasonable inferences in that party’s

Boise Cascade Corp, 141 Idaho 233, 238, 108 P.3d 380, 385 (2005). Ifreasonable

people could reach different conclusions or inferences from the evidence, the motion must be
denied. 141 Idaho at 238, 108 P.3d at 385.

The nonmoving party must submit more than

just

conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists t0 Withstand summary judgment. Id.

mere

scintilla

of evidence 0r only slight doubt as to the facts

issue of material fact for the purposes 0f

896—97, 155 P.3d 695, 697—98 (2007).

judgment purposes unless

it

relates t0

is

A

not sufﬁcient t0 create a genuine

summary judgment. Finholt

v.

Cresto, 143 Idaho 894,

A disputed fact Will not be deemed “material” for summary

an issue disclosed by the pleadings. Argyle

v.

Slemaker, 107

Idaho 668, 669—70, 691 P.2d 1283, 1284—85 (Ct. App. 1984); Bennett v. Bliss, 103 Idaho 358, 360,

647 P.2d 814, 816

(Ct.

App. 1982). Instead, the nonmoving party must respond

judgment motion With speciﬁc
Nungester

D.

& Lezamiz, Ina,

facts

showing there

is

to the

summary

a genuine issue for trial. Samuel v. Hepworth,

134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000).

Have Failed t0 Carry Their Burden on Appeal 0f Showing the District Court
CDC’S and other Guidelines Failed T0 Raise a Genuine Issue 0f
Material Fact and that the Petitioners Were Entitled t0 Judgment as a Matter 0f Law
Williams

et a1.

Erred in Concluding the

The

district court’s

Memorandum Decision and Order shows Why the petitioners’

bare and

conclusory allegations failed t0 raise a genuine issue of material fact in light of the Declaration of
Lt.

Gavin and the Sheriff s

exhibits.

began implementing COVID19 threat mitigation procedures on March 13, 2020 by quarantining symptomatic
prisoners. Declaration of Lt. Shauna Gavin, at 1] 8. Jail deputies were also told to
[T]he declaration 0f Lt. Gavin provides that the
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practice

good hygiene.

On March

Id.

2020,

16,

all

See also Respondents” Exhibits

prisoner programs at the jail were suspended.

11

9.

U1 and U2.

On March

17, 2020, deputies and staff were required t0 screen all new
and symptomatic arrestees were t0 be refused and sent to the hospital for
medical clearance. Arrestees cleared to come into the jail were quarantined for
fourteen days. 1] 10. See also Respondents’ Exhibit V. Detention employees were
also checked each shift and symptomatic employees were sent home until medically

arrestees

cleared.

1]

11.

As of March

17,

2020, detention deputies were informed that symptomatic

prisoners were to be quarantined, with immediate notiﬁcation 0f the medical

provider for the proper course 0f action. Detention deputies would minimize
contact with the prisoner and

would wear

full protective gear,

When

in contact.

ﬂ

12.

Also on March 17, 2020, ICE detainees at the jail were quarantined and
were removed from the jail, the jail was sanitized. 1] 13.

after they

Also on March

17,

2020, the Elmore County Prosecutor sent a

list

0f

ﬂ 14. Only ﬁve ofthe forty-three
See Order Re: Motion for Expedited Discovery and

potential prisoners that could possibly be released.
petitioners

were on

this

list.

I.R.C.P. 37 Sanctions.

On March
Rule 13

2020, the Idaho Supreme Court amended Idaho Misdemeanor

18,

t0 allow for

“book and release”

which the jail followed. ﬂ

On March
and inmate labor

19,

2020, the

detail

On March

for a variety 0f

jail’s

work

release. split time,

programs were suspended.

22, 2020, detention deputies

1]

11

As of March

offenses,

weekender options,

16.

were told

supplies and equipment to the jail pods every day,

done 0n Mondays.

misdemeanor

15.

when

to provide cleaning

previously this

was not

17.

23, 2020.

all

Sheriff’s

Ofﬁce employee

training outside of the

county had t0 be pre-approved and any employees planning t0 travel outside of the
county had t0 contact their supervisor. ﬂ 18.

As of March 25, 2020,
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screening form in the prisoner’s ﬁle and medical in-box.

19

1]

19.

See also

Respondents’ Exhibit V.

On March

commitments

26, 2020, the jail stopped accepting

to serve jail

time. Id. at ﬂ 20.

Also 0n March 26, 2020, all prisoners received notice 0f the jail’s
21. See also Respondents’ Exhibit U2.
1]

COVID-

19 precautions.

On March 27,

pods 1100 and 1200 were cleared of prisoners and
designated as quarantine pods. New arrestees would be held in the quarantine pod
for fourteen days, With regular COVID- 1 9 medical checks. 11 22.

As of March

2020,

jail

were no longer sent to a central location
for haircuts, hair cutting supplies were t0 be sanitized, the jail obtained a computer
for Video-conferencing use by prisoners, and purchased touchless thermometers. 1]
30, 2020, prisoners

23.

On April

1,

2020, arrestees are brought t0 the jail sally port Where deputies

wearing protective gear take
screening questionnaire.

N0

their temperature

and go through the COVID—19
have been allowed into

arresting deputies 0r ofﬁcers

the jail past the pre-booking area[] since April 6, 2020.

1]

24.

Since April 7, 2020, the jail has been accepting commitments as advised by
Elmore County Prosecutor. People seeking t0 serve commitment time are met
by deputies wearing protective gear and are screened. Symptomatic people are not
allowed into the jail. People seeking t0 serve commitments Who are allowed in are
issued face masks and quarantined. 1] 25.
the

As 0f April

8,

2020, spray bottles 0f disinfectant have been distributed t0

each pod and are picked up after use t0 prevent them from being used as a weapon.
1]

26.

On

April 13, 2020, the

jail started

using telemedicine for prisoner mental

health Visits. ﬂ 27.

As oprril
t0

14,

2020,

wear a mask and gloves,

all

prisoners transported outside ofthe jail are required

as are the transport ofﬁcers. Transport vehicles are

sanitized after use, as are belly chains, shackles, and handcuffs.

use ﬂex cuffs

is

also encouraged,
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The use 0f single

No

evidence, admissible 0r inadmissible, has been presented

by

the

summary judgment motion, showing
have not been implemented or are not being
followed. The petitioners have not submitted evidence raising a genuine issue 0f

petitioners in opposition to the respondents’
that these mitigation procedures

material

fact

that

the respondents’

mitigation actions

constituted

deliberate

indifference or the imposition of punishment.

In their response t0 the

summary judgment motion,

the petitioners d0 not

argue that these mitigation procedures have not been undertaken, rather, they argue

employing the social distancing and prisoner separation measures
forth in the CDC guidelines for jails and correctional facilities and is also taking

that the jail is not
set

insufﬁcient measures. as set forth in the guidelines to sanitize prisoner living

Response

spaces. See

in Opposition to Respondents’

Summary Judgment Motion,

at 12- 1 7.

The

argument ignores the fact that these are guidelines and the
document is intended t0 provide guideline principles for
healthcare and nonhealthcare administrators 0f correctional and detention facilities
This guidance Will not necessarily address every possible custodial setting
The guidance may need to be adapted based 0n individual facilities’ physical space,
stafﬁng, population, operations, and other resources and conditions.” Interim
Guidance 0n Management 0f Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID—19) in
Correctional and Detention Facilities, at 1 (emphasis in original). The language
cited by the petitioners in their response supports the aspirational nature 0f the
guidelines, as they are citing guidelines language that certain measures “should” 0r
“if possible” or “if space allows” be implemented. See Response in Opposition to
Respondents’ Summary Judgment Motion, at
petitioners’

guidelines specify: “[t]his

.

.

.

.

.

.

12-17.

The reason

that these

CDC

are

“guidelines” and for the use 0f the

aspirational language in the guidelines is that “[a]ll prison facilities, by deﬁnition,
have living conditions that prevent inmates from practicing the social distancing
[set forth in] current guidance from the CDC and our state government.” Money v.
F. Supp. _, _, 2020
Pritzker,
1820660, *3 (ND. Ill].). The respondents
COVID-19
in
threat by seeking to keep the Virus
response t0 the
have chosen to act
out the jail, through contact limiting measures, quarantines, and other mitigation
measures as detailed above.

_

The

WL

failure to strictly adhere t0 all aspects
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guidelines themselves acknowledge are not “one size ﬁts all,” does not Violate the
Constitution, particularly

where mitigation

efforts t0 the extent

of these are being

undertaken.”

(R., pp. 382-92.)

For the forgoing reasons, the

summary judgment.
The

district court

granted the respondents’ motion for

(R., p. 397.)

petitioners’

arguments on appeal to the contrary amount to an invitation to

prospectively second guess the Sheriffs mitigation measures by converting mere guidelines,

which were not intended
doing

so, let

to

be prescriptive,

into absolute

mandates without legal authority for

alone showing the district court erred by granting the Sheriff’s motion for

As noted in the

judgment. (Appellant’s Br., pp. 27-32.)

district court’s

summary

Memorandum Decision and

Order, the respondents have a legitimate governmental interest in the petitioners being in jail,

i.e.,

genuine public safety concerns particular t0 the prisoner-petitioners based upon the charges they

have pending against them, including the protection 0fthe public, and assurance that the petitioners
will be present to

answer for the charges for which they were detained 0r the sentences they are

serving 0r are awaiting to serve. (R., p. 395.)

no authority

On appeal,

for the proposition that the threat of the

as in the district court, the petitioners cite

COVID—19

Virus

is

card for nearly half 0f a jail’s population, regardless of the circumstances

of the underlying reasons for which the prisoner
cited

on appeal

if either authority or

is

argument

at the jail

in jail. (R., pp. 394-95.)

is

to raise a

is

waived 0n appeal. The

genuine issue of material fact

is

and regardless

A party waives an issue

lacking, not just if both are lacking. State

Gurney, 152 Idaho 502, 505, 272 P.3d 474, 477 (2012); Zichko, 129 Idaho
Therefore, the issue

a “get out of jail free”

district court’s dismissal

at

v.

263, 923 P.2d at 970.

of the petitions for

failure

not challenged 0n appeal and should not be reviewed.

V.

The

District

On

Court Correctly Applied Idaho Code S 12-122 in Awarding Respondents their
Attorney’s Fees

appeal, Williams et

authority for

a1.

acknowledge the

district court’s citation to applicable legal

award 0f attorney’s fees and only argue the court mischaracterizes
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their claims

and

arguments and that they address unsettled law.

The

facts

and circumstances of the COVID-19

pandemic may be new, but the law regarding conditions of conﬁnement
applying the equivalent Eighth

by

the district court in

its

petitioners utterly failed to

conﬁnement
amounted

in the Jail

Amendment

Memorandum

show the mere

analysis to detainees,

is

in Violation

As

not unsettled.

Decision and Order and in

existence of the

of due process
discussed

this brief (above), the

COVID— 1 9 pandemic and conditions

of

and COVID-19 mitigation measures constituted deliberate indifference 0r

t0 the imposition

0f punishment. Thus, the petitioners’ habeas cases were brought and

pursued frivolously.
Idaho Code § 12-122 provides, in pertinent

part:

In any habeas corpus action brought

by a

state penitentiary or

county

inmate, the judge shall award reasonable attorney’s fees t0 the respondent,

judgment 0f the

court, the

if,

jail

in the

habeas corpus action was brought frivolously by the

petitioner.

For purposes of

“brought frivolously,” shall

this section,

mean

that the

upon claims Which
were true, they did not,

petitioner petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus based
either

had no basis

in fact or,

as a matter 0f law, justify
court, in

when the
or

its

discretion,

even

any

may

if the factual allegations

relief t0 the petitioner; provided,

however, that the

determine that the action was not brought frivolously

action involves a material issue of law that has not been settled

by supreme

statute

court decision in this state.

Noting that Williams

et a1.

did not respond to the respondents’ attorney fees request in their

response opposing the Sheriff” s motion for
authorities regarding

by

award of attorney’s

summary judgment,

the court reviewed the legal

fees:

The determination as to whether a petition is frivolous rests in the trial court’ s sound
discretion. See, e.g., Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982)
(construing a similar statute, LC. § 12-121). However, such discretion must be
exercised in accordance With applicable legal standards. Associates Northwest. Inc.
v.

Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 733 P.

as here, questions 0f

law are

2d 824

(Ct.

App. 1987).

We have held that Where,

raised, the nonprevailing party’s position is not

automatically frivolous simply because the court is unpersuaded. Rather, the test is
Whether the nonprevailing party’s position is plainly fallacious and, therefore, not
fairly debatable. GulfChemical Employees Federal Credit Union v. Williams, 107
Idaho 890, 693 P.2d 1092 (Ct. App. 1984); Werlinger v. State, 117 Idaho 47, 50,
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785 P.2d 172, 175

(Ct.

App. 1990).

397-938.) The district court reviewed the petitioners’ claims and arguments throughout

(R., pp.

the course of habeas proceedings: their failure t0 individually exhaust administrative remedies,
fallacious “piggyback” exhaustion theory; failure t0 provide

sworn 0r equivalent statements;

assertion 0f bare and conclusory claims; failure to identify any actions of the Sheriff constituting
deliberate indifference 0r unconstitutional imposition 0f punishment; erroneous insistence that the

Sheriff bear the burden to

show cause Why habeas

pursuit 0f discovery sanctions

be granted under I.A.R. S(d);

When discovery was not authorized; and attempt to raise a new claim

— COVID— 1 9 caused delay in criminal proceedings
rights t0

relief should not

due process — for the ﬁrst time in

resulting in alleged Violation of the petitioners’

their response t0 the Sheriff’s

motion. (R., pp. 398-400.) The court recounted

its

summary judgment

ruling that the petitioners’

claims had n0 basis in fact and sought t0 use “a generalized threat 0f the
the court should essentially

become

summary judgment

COVID-19”

to argue that

the “super-administrator” of the Jail and order their release

without regard to the crimes, charges, 0r Violations for Which they were being held. (R., pp. 399400.)

Based upon the forgoing law, ﬁndings, and the

cases per Idaho

Code

§

limitations

on injunctive

relief in

habeas

19-4217, the court properly concluded the petitioners’ habeas proceedings

were pursued frivolously and awarded attorney’s fees

t0 the Sheriff. (R., p.

401 .)

VI.

The Respondents Request Statutory Attorney’s Fees on Appeal
The Sheriff requests

attorney’s fees

(Attorney’s fees in habeas corpus actions.

Idaho Code § 12-121

When

0n appeal under Idaho Code §§ 12-121 and/or 12-122

The Court

Will

award fees

the Court believes “that the action

frivolously, unreasonably, or Without foundation.”

t0 a prevailing party

was pursued, defended, or brought

Idaho Military Historical Soc ’y,

156 Idaho 624, 633, 329 P.3d 1072, 1081 (2014). Where an action
frivolously, reasonable attorney fees

may

be awarded under LC.

§

(Williams et

al. v.
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is

Inc.

a1.

v.

Maslen,

brought 0r pursued

12—122. Drennon

141 Idaho 34, 40, 105 P.3d 694, 700 (Ct. App. 2004). Because Williams et
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under

v.

Craven,

have failed t0 present

material issues 0f unsettled law in this appeal and based

upon

frivolous arguments raised for the ﬁrst time, argument based
let

0n

the petitioners’ presentation 0f

facts outside the record

0n appeal,

alone facts not existing at the time the petitions were ﬁled, and their waiver 0f issues by failure

to provide

argument and authority, attorney’s fees are appropriate under

I.C.

§§ 12—121 and/or

12-122.

CONCLUSION
The Sheriff respectfully

requests that this court

Decision and Order Re: Motion for

habeas petitions 0f Williams

et a1.

afﬁrm the

Summary Judgment and

district court’s

entry of

Judgment dismissing the

with prejudice.

DATED this 5th day of August 2020
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